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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an analysis of the application of the philosophical concept of free 
will to intelligent machines. It is argued that we need to transfer the concept to a 
more empirical approach in philosophy in order to be able to answer questions about 
the design of intelligent systems that are required to operate in areas of society where 
the concept of free will is necessary. Therefore, free will is viewed as a social or 
relational concept. The relations between intelligent machines and their environment 
are defined in terms of interaction points on the knowledge level and the dialogue 
level. Based on a case study into case-based reasoning and the CREEK system 
developed at NTNU in Trondheim, these relations are analysed from both an actor-
network and a phenomenological perspective. 
 
According to the actor-network approach, we can inscribe properties into artefacts. 
This leads to a framework for modelling free will in intelligent machines, founded on 
the tension between what a machine ‘can’ do and what it ‘will’ do, or on the 
connection between hermeneutic and existential views in phenomenology. 
Phenomenology also provides the possibility for evaluation of the mediation machines 
can perform in the relation between humans and reality, which is necessary if we are 
introducing machines in decision-making. This view is linked to the perspective of 
free will issues. Some evaluative remarks are given based on the analysis of case-
based reasoning and CREEK. 
 2
Preface 
 
When I was looking for an assignment in computer science as a practical training in 
my study at the University of Twente, I decided that I would like to go to Norway. 
The coordinator of practical training sent an e-mail about my plans to Agnar Aamodt, 
professor in artificial intelligence in Trondheim. My curriculum vitae included 
information about my second study, philosophy of science, technology and society. It 
turned out that not only I could come to Trondheim, but that it would be possible to 
do a more philosophical assignment as well, drawn up by Jörg Cassens. I decided to 
take that project, because the three months research would also exempt me from doing 
a practical training in philosophy, so this would be an excellent combination. After 
approval of the computer science department in Twente, everything was arranged.  
 
This is the result of a three months study into the subject ‘Free will and intelligent 
machines’. To translate this subject into a more concrete plan, the focus is on the 
case-based reasoning system developed in Trondheim as well as on the actor-network 
theory and the (post)phenomenological approach in philosophy. Free will is not 
regarded as a property of consciousness, but as a social or relational concept. This 
makes it possible to avoid discussing difficult questions about the nature of 
consciousness and give a systematic analysis and a basis for further research, within 
the three months period. 
 
I would like to thank Olf Broenink for his share in arranging the practical matters, 
Anton Nijholt and Philip Brey for their support from Twente, and Agnar Aamodt and 
Jörg Cassens for their accompaniment here in Trondheim. Further thanks to Peter-
Paul, Carsten & Annette, Cecilie, Beate & Martin, Anika and all family and friends 
who gave me inspiration with their e-mails and phone calls. 
 
Trondheim, June 2001 
 
Wolter Pieters 
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1 Introduction: The empirical turn 
In philosophy of technology, many famous persons have tried to capture the essence 
of technology and relate this to society and human experience. In the first half of the 
20th century, the results of their analysis mainly showed a discrepancy between the 
technology and human life. Technology was seen as an autonomous force, which 
crushed essential parts of humanity. By reducing the concept of technology to 
historical and transcendental presumptions, philosophers seemed to abstract from the 
influence of concrete developments. 
During the eighties, a more empiricist view on technology developed, based on the 
ideas of American philosophers, who included the influence of concrete technologies 
in their views (Achterhuis, 1997). The mutual dependencies of technology and society 
are a main theme in this research. This ‘empirical turn’ made it possible to account for 
the many faces of technology, the many roles it can play in society. This view was 
further developed among philosophers of technology, for instance at the University of 
Twente (see e.g. Verbeek, 1999). 
 
This study is an attempt to use this empirical view on philosophy of technology in the 
context of artificial intelligence. The main theme chosen here is the concept of free 
will. Although it is possible to analyse this from the classical perspective, and reduce 
the question to the transcendental presumptions of free will and artificial intelligence, 
this probably will not be of any relevance when talking about concrete developments 
in computer science. Therefore, we concentrate on the empirical view of philosophy 
of technology. 
The goal is threefold. In the first place, I will try to translate the concept of free will to 
a more empirical approach to philosophical questions about artificial intelligence. 
This requires reconsidering the common sense notion of free will. The second and 
third aims are complementary: I will show that this notion can be used to analyse a 
concrete artificial intelligence system and I will show that it is possible to use existing 
philosophical theories to build this analysis. 
 
The next chapter gives a short and focused introduction into the philosophical issues 
in artificial intelligence. Thereafter, I introduce the concept of free will and the view I 
am taking in this study. In the fourth chapter, it is shown that this view on free will 
can be applied to intelligent machines. The empirical analysis of a concrete system, 
the case-based reasoning system CREEK, is described in chapter 5. This forms the 
basis for the philosophical analysis using the actor-network theory (chapter 6) and the 
(post-) phenomenological approach (chapter 7). In the last chapter, it is time for 
discussion of the results and conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 Philosophy of artificial intelligence 
Artificial intelligence 
Artificial intelligence was initiated as a research field in 1956. It is occupied with 
intelligent behaviour in computational machines. The goals of the research can be 
grouped into four categories: 
• Systems that think like humans 
• Systems that think rationally 
• Systems that act like humans 
• Systems that act rationally 
After years of great optimism of the achievability of these tasks, problems arose in the 
field, concerning how to represent intelligence that could be useful in applications. 
This included lack of background knowledge, intractability of the computations and 
limitations in the knowledge representation structures (Russell & Norvig, 1995, pp. 
20-21). But problems came not only from the design community. Philosophers, who 
have since Plato been occupied by intelligence and reasoning, started to complain as 
well. Using both mathematical objections (based on Turing and Gödel) and more 
philosophical arguments about the nature of human intelligence, they tried to show 
the inherent limitations of the AI project. The most famous of them was Hubert 
Dreyfus. 
Dreyfus 
Dreyfus saw in the goals and methods of artificial intelligence a clear rationalist view 
on intelligence. This had been defended by many rationalist philosophers throughout 
history, but Dreyfus himself was more into anti-rationalist 20th century philosophy, as 
seen in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. According to 
Dreyfus, the most fundamental way of knowing is intuitive rather than rational. When 
getting expertise in a field, one is only bound to formalized rules when first learning 
the reasoning. After that, the intelligence is rather present as rules of thumb and 
intuitive decisions. 
The rational approach of AI is clear in the foundations of what is called symbolic AI. 
Intelligent processes are seen as a form of information processing, and the 
representation of this information is symbolic. Intelligence is thus more or less 
reduced to symbol manipulation. Dreyfus analysed this as a combination of three 
fundamental assumptions: 
• the psychological assumption, which states that human intelligence is rule-
based symbol manipulation 
• the epistemological assumption, stating that all knowledge is formalizable 
• the ontological assumption, which states that reality has a formalizable 
structure 
Dreyfus not only criticized these assumptions, but also gave some concepts which he 
finds are necessary for intelligence. According to Dreyfus, intelligence is embodied 
and situated. The embodiment is difficult to account for, because it is unclear whether 
this means that intelligence requires a body or that intelligence can only develop with 
the aid of a body (Brey, 2001). But at least it is clear that for Dreyfus, intelligence 
depends on the situation in which an intelligent agent finds itself, in which the 
elements are in a meaningful relation with their context. This makes it impossible to 
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reduce reality to formalizable entities. Dreyfus’ view makes it impossible for symbol-
manipulating machines to function outside a well-defined formal domain. 
Dreyfus is more positive about the connectionist approach to artificial intelligence. In 
this approach, intelligent behaviour emerges from simulated structures that resemble 
neurons and their connections in the human brain. But he doubts whether the 
complexity of the human brain is ever feasible in such machines. 
Limitations of Dreyfus’ view 
In this way, Dreyfus opened the discussion about the feasibility of AI goals. His work 
got a lot of attention and was subject to heavy debate. He even managed to get some 
researchers to alter their view and start implementing systems that were more 
compatible with his view. Dreyfus has shown the assumptions that symbolic AI made 
and made clear that it was by no means apparent that these assumptions would lead to 
real intelligent machines. 
There are, however, two reservations to be made. First, Dreyfus based his critique on 
strict symbolic approaches of AI. In the last decades several attempts were made to 
more hybrid intelligent systems, and the introduction of non-rule-based methods into 
symbolic AI.  These systems put forward a different view on intelligence, which 
cannot wholly be accounted for by Dreyfus’ analysis. Second, Dreyfus’ critique 
seems to be based on a scepticist view on AI, partly because of his own philosophical 
background and partly because the fundaments were built in a time in which the 
enthusiasm was almost unlimited. 
Approach in this study 
This paper takes a different track in both the kind of systems that are analysed and the 
philosophical approach. The systems considered in this paper are case-based 
reasoning systems, which are basically symbolic, but apply non-rule-based learning 
techniques. The philosophical approach taken is not one of searching for limits 
(‘What computers can’t do’), but one of the possibilities of intelligent machines and 
the freedom they have in their behaviour (what computers can do). This is achieved 
by first introducing the philosophical concept of free will and arguing that we must 
apply this concept to intelligent machines as well as to humans. 
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3 General observations on free will 
Free will 
Free will is a strange concept. In philosophy, it is possible to discuss the human mind 
in all kinds of ways, but when one touches the question whether we are free in our 
decisions, the discussion becomes dangerous. We are so familiar with thinking in 
terms of will, decisions and actions that we most of the time do not even want to 
consider the possibility that we are not free in our choices. But there is more. What if 
I, in such a discussion, make the statement that human free will does not exist? If it is 
not true, I am wrong, and if it is true, the whole remark is meaningless because I could 
not have done anything else than saying this. Denial of free will is a pragmatic 
contradiction. One cannot deny human free will without making this denial 
meaningless. 
 
Still, the question of free will seems relevant, because scientific theories may suggest 
that everything that happens, happens according to the laws of nature. Therefore, we 
either need to assign special properties to humans, or deny that nature’s laws are 
deterministic, if we want to keep ourselves from being deterministic organic 
machines. The first option is connected with many philosophical theories, but most of 
all with that of Descartes, who divides the world in two substances (spirit and matter), 
which are connected in human beings. The second option opens for more holistic 
visions, which use more recent developments in physics (relativity, quantum 
mechanics) to show that our free will may reside in the unpredictability of the 
dynamics of nature. 
The dualistic view of Descartes and others denies the possibility of free will for other 
things than humans. Therefore it is not quite interesting to a discussion about free will 
and intelligent machines. On the other hand are holistic visions more appropriate to 
such a discussion, but it is difficult to come to any other conclusions than the physical 
presumptions that are necessary to assign the property of free will, either to humans or 
to computers. This might be relevant in a pure philosophical discussion, but has little 
to do with computer science. 
There is also the possibility of accepting that there is an inherent contradiction in 
human nature, since both the deterministic and the free will view on humans are 
justifiable and necessary. This dialectic approach allows thinking about free will in 
humans without being concerned about the physical presumptions. Free will becomes 
a transcendental presumption for being human. However, the transcendental view on 
free will in this approach does not allow discussing free will in concrete artefacts, 
such as intelligent machines, because one cannot model or design transcendental 
presumptions. 
Two approaches to free will 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will translate the difficult concept of free will to a 
concept that can be used for analysing intelligent machines. This concept needs to be 
compatible with the empirical approach in philosophy of technology. Therefore, we 
must avoid talking about the concept of free will in terms of physical or 
transcendental presumptions, but try to focus on the role the concept plays in society. 
 
The clue to my approach in this article lies in the introducing paragraph of this 
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chapter. My view on the discussion about free will is that there are two fundamentally 
different approaches to any research in this area. The first focuses on deep 
philosophical questions about the nature of free will and the possibilities for humans 
to escape from nature’s ‘demands’. I will call this the physical approach. In a paper 
on intelligent machines, this leads to philosophical debates that focus on human 
nature and not so much on computer nature, because we find ourselves in a position 
where we have to defend our own free will in any case, and say something about 
computers too because we just wanted to write a paper about this. In other words, the 
debate becomes a comparison between humans and computers in which neither 
humans nor computers can recognize themselves. 
 
The other approach, which is subtly suggested in the first paragraph of this chapter, 
focuses on the impossibility of denying our own free will. As said before, this denial 
makes itself meaningless. But it not only makes itself meaningless, it also destroys the 
fundaments for responsibility in general. This means that we cannot praise or blame a 
person for what he says or does, so we have to reconsider the principles of 
jurisdiction, labour, friendship, love and whatever we built our society upon. All these 
societal issues require choices, and whenever choices are involved, we need the 
concept of free will. The point of this is that free will is an essential presumption for 
our society, no matter if it is physically justifiable. I will call this the social approach. 
 
Whether the presumption of free will is only necessary for our society or for any 
human society is a difficult question. I will consider this question anyway, because it 
may give a more philosophical foundation for the essentiality of free will than just 
pointing to constructions in our own society. Answering seems not possible without 
reconsidering human nature, and thus reintroducing the physical approach to free will. 
But when we state that interaction is the core of human civilization, the necessity of 
the concept of free will follows naturally. For we cannot interact with people without 
supposing them to be free to influence the course of the interaction, because any 
human interaction supposes that we do not know beforehand what the outcome will 
be. Interactions are thus characterized by choices, and therefore by the concept of free 
will. If interactions are fundamental in any society, we must also state that it is 
impossible in any society to deny free will. 
Ascribing free will in a meaningful society 
We have thus made plausible, both by looking at our own society and by 
philosophical reasoning, that our society cannot do without free will. This means that 
we do not need to tackle the difficult philosophical questions when taking the social 
approach to free will, and can thus start examining the properties of human and 
especially machine free will. I take the point of view that we need to ascribe the 
property of free will to actors in a meaningful society, because we otherwise are 
denying the roots of our civilization, and even the possibility of discussing these 
issues. 
This is different from the compatibilist view, which states that free will is compatible 
with determinism, because free will arises from internal decision processes ‘even if 
these processes themselves are deterministic’ (McCarthy, 1999). Although I defended 
such a position myself (Pieters, 1997), I am now taking an agnostic view here, 
because the analysis does not require taking a position in this issue and I have many 
doubts about the truth and especially the usability of the compatibilist view. 
 9
4 Free will and intelligent machines 
In this chapter, I try to design a framework for analysing free will issues in intelligent 
systems. First, I show that free will is a necessary concept when considering 
intelligent machines. Then, I try to find the roots of machine free will. The third part 
of the chapter is concerned with defining the relations between these machines and 
their environment, which form the locations of free will issues. 
Ascribing free will to machines 
We are now at the point that we are introducing intelligent machines both in society 
and in this paper. During the industrial revolutions, we constructed a lot of machinery 
that was aimed at performing tasks that replaced human labour. Now we are 
introducing machinery that is supposed to perform intelligent tasks, especially 
decision-making. This means that we are in a process of putting more and more of 
ourselves into machines, and there is a limit to what we can accept in this. Because 
these machines confront us with ourselves, we cannot just keep broadening the area of 
tasks they perform without thinking about them in a more human way. 
Why machines have come into our world 
A source for clarifying this issue is found in a classical dichotomy in computer 
science: the distinction between tools and games. Tools are meant for manipulating 
data that somehow are relevant in the user’s world. Games are meant for interaction 
between the user and some constructed world. In other words: machines as tools take 
part in the human world and humans as game-players take part in the machine world. 
This distinction is less apparent when machines start to become intelligent, especially 
when they are taking part in decision-making. The function of the tool is no longer 
just manipulating data, and the game is no longer a virtual world. Decisions are made 
in interaction between the human world and the machine’s world. Humans and 
machines are now talking about the same subjects, although from a different 
perspective. This means that machines are taking part in social interactions. And as I 
have tried to show in the previous chapter, meaningful social interactions require 
ascribing a concept of free will. 
 
I agree there is something counterintuitive in this approach. Common sense says that 
we are humans and we create and use machines for our purposes, not that machines 
are social actors. But I think there is an inherent conflict in this common sense view. 
There is an analogy with a theme in the book ‘Sofies Verden’ (‘Sofie’s World’) by 
Jostein Gaarder. There are two types of characters in this book. First, there are the 
characters of Sofie and her philosophy teacher. Then it turns out that they are just 
characters that are constructed by a father who writes a novel to his daughter. These 
are the ‘real’ characters, and one of these – the father who writes the book – ‘designs’ 
Sofie’s world. Sofie and her philosophy teacher decide to escape from the fake world. 
Things then get mixed up, because the story is written by an author who lets his own 
characters try to escape, but at the same time writes about himself as the person who 
tries to keep them under control. Sofie and her teacher cannot say or do anything 
meaningful, because the story is designed for them. In the end, the characters manage 
to escape from the novel, but it turns out that it is not possible to interact with the real 
world (or maybe it is, but that is up to the reader). 
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Let’s reformulate the whole story. Humans design intelligent systems. When we view 
these machines as constructions, they operate in a constructed world. But when we let 
them try to escape into the real world (solve real-world problems, interact with 
people), and at the same time try to keep them under control, we get the problem that 
there is a conflict between the decision-making capabilities and the view that we 
constructed them as characters. Intelligent machines cannot say or do anything 
meaningful, because the story is designed for them. The fear that machines may get 
out of control is based on the common sense view that we control them in the first 
place. But characters that we fully control cannot interact with the real world, because 
interaction requires freedom and the attribution of free will. Intelligent machines are 
not characters we construct to operate under our control in a fake world. What we 
want them to do is to operate in the real world and function as actors that contribute to 
our social life. 
The social life of machines 
If we introduce intelligent machines in a society that is characterized by attributing 
free will to actors in this society (which as I have shown is the fundamental insight in 
the social approach to free will), we must attribute the same free will to machines that 
take over our tasks in areas where this attribution of free will is necessary. We cannot 
have machines that we interact with, that make decisions, that change our lives, just 
be apparatuses, because we are then denying the relevance of our own decisions and 
interactions. Having machines do these things is not a rationalization of our own 
mental processes as many people fear; it is ascribing our own world of thinking into 
machines, including our way of social interaction. And of course we are not likely to 
fall in love with machines or something, but our hormones are not a reason for 
denying them a social life. 
Thus, when we introduce machines into decision-making processes, we do not need to 
wonder if they are physically able to have a free will, but we must ascribe this 
property to them, simply because the decisions would otherwise be meaningless. This 
machine free will then emerges from their relation to their environment, as well as our 
own free will emerges from our relations to society, when seen from a social 
perspective. 
Ascribing free will to machines 
I have shown that free will is a necessary concept in intelligent machines that are 
required to make meaningful decisions and take part in meaningful interactions. The 
keyword is ascribing free will to social actors, including intelligent machines. And 
this is not mainly a believe in the freedom of machines in their behaviour (which I 
doubt as much as human free will), but most of all a requirement for designing such 
machines. 
The roots of machine free will 
Intelligence 
We have discussed the necessity of ascribing social properties (including free will) to 
intelligent machines. We cannot yet define where to find this free will in an intelligent 
machine. First, we have to take a closer look on the nature of intelligent machines. 
But what is intelligence? McCarthy and Hayes (1969) define: 
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‘An entity is intelligent if it has an adequate model of the world (including the 
intellectual world of mathematics, understanding of its own goals and other mental 
processes), if it is clever enough to answer a wide variety of questions on the basis of 
this model, if it can get additional information from the external world when required, 
and can perform such tasks in the external world as its goals demand and its physical 
abilities permit.’ 
 
What I miss in this definition is the relation between the intelligent agent and the 
environment. It is only implicitly present in ‘getting additional information from the 
external world’. There seems to be no external world unless the agent needs it. But the 
agent is undoubtedly influenced by its environment (for example its designers and its 
users) and the actions of the agent influence its surroundings. Especially in decision-
making systems, this notion is essential. Dreyfus calls this the ‘situatedness’ of 
intelligence. This is interesting for what follows in the discussion of intelligence by 
McCarthy and Hayes: 
 
‘According to this definition intelligence has two parts, which we shall call the 
epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of 
the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts 
expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis 
of the information solves the problem and decides what to do.’ (McCarthy and Hayes, 
1969, p. 5) 
 
In this quotation, we observe that both the epistemological part and the heuristic part 
of intelligence arise in interaction with the outside world. The representation of the 
world is formed by interpretation of observations and the decision-making process 
results in actions that in some way affect this world. This means that an intelligent 
machine is characterized by its relations with the world it is placed in. 
Free will as a relational concept 
The implicit focus on relations is even more apparent in the notion of ‘can’ which is 
presented in both McCarthy and Hayes (1969) and McCarthy (1999). This last article 
explicitly focuses on free will issues. The notion of ‘can’ as meant here is based on 
the analysis of properties of intelligent machines in terms of subautomata. Their 
automaton representation consists in ‘regarding the world as a system of interacting 
subautomata’, which are deterministic finite automata. ‘Can’ is defined as the range of 
possibilities a subautomaton has considering ‘the effects of sequences of its actions, 
quite apart from the conditions that determine what it actually will do’. To show what 
a subautomaton can do, it is disconnected from the system, such that what it can do 
depends only on the properties of the environment. What a person or machine can do 
thus depends on its position in the environment rather than on its own properties. 
 
We may translate this to the social approach in free will issues by looking at free will 
as something that arises from the relationship between an agent and its environment. 
Based on the properties of the environment, the agent has the possibility to do several 
things (‘can’), and its own properties or configurations determine what actions it 
performs (‘will’). The concept of free will arises thus out of the tension between 
possibilities and reality, or the tension between the environment and the agent. Free 
will becomes a relational concept for machines. In fact, this is the same as the free 
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will we ascribe to humans from a social perspective, because we perceive a tension 
between what a person can do and what he actually does (choices). 
Relations with machines 
This relational view on free will is interesting when we start discussing the 
environment of an intelligent machine, especially its relations with humans. We will 
try to capture both the design context and the functioning context of the machine in a 
conceptual scheme. We first take a look at the design context. In the design of 
intelligent agents, knowledge is a fundamental concept. 
The knowledge level 
Newell (1982) realises that knowledge depends on relations: ‘Knowledge, in the 
principle of rationality, is defined entirely in terms of the environment of the agent, 
for it is the environment that is the object of the agent’s goals, and whose features 
therefore bear on the way actions can attain goals.’ (p. 109-110). The principle of 
rationality states that ‘if an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one 
of its goals, then the agent will perform that action’ (p. 102). 
Newell introduces in this paper a new level in computer systems: the knowledge level. 
It is characterised by four features: 
• a complete absence of structure 
• no specification of processing mechanisms, only a global principle to be 
satisfied by system behaviour 
• a radical degree of approximation that does not guarantee a deterministic 
machine 
• a medium that is not realized in physical space in a passive way, but only in an 
active process of selection 
The knowledge level lies above the symbol or programming level. Contrary to symbol 
structures, knowledge has an abstract and competence-like character. The global 
principle on the knowledge level is the principle of rationality, which is formulated in 
terms of actions, knowledge and goals. Thus, the knowledge level consists of actions, 
knowledge and goals, which are related by the principle of rationality. 
Because an agent does not necessarily know what the consequences of its actions are, 
there is uncertainty in its behaviour. ‘Sometimes behaviour can be predicted by the 
knowledge level description; often it cannot.’ Therefore, the knowledge level allows 
non-determinism. Knowledge is defined as ‘whatever can be ascribed to an agent, 
such that its behaviour can be computed according to the principle of rationality’. 
 
The knowledge level makes it possible to describe an intelligent machine in human 
terms, including non-determinism. The designer interacts with the system at the 
knowledge level. 
The sign and signal processes 
If we are building intelligent agents, we ascribe to them certain ways of knowing and 
thinking. But that is not the whole story. We also ascribe properties to intelligent 
machines when we are using them. Thus, when a designer builds an expert system for 
medical diagnosis, he ascribes at the knowledge level medical knowledge in a way 
that makes it possible for the system to function in a given context. But when the 
system in fact functions in this context, its users have a view on the system that 
ascribes also properties that are not fixed by the design. They may for example view 
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the system as a provider of a diagnosis, as a possibility for second opinion, as a source 
of information, etc. Both designers and users interact with the system, a process in 
which the machine becomes what it is. 
Nake (1994) distinguishes in this context between a sign process and a signal process. 
The sign process is the meaningful dialogue between the machine and the user, the 
signal process the reduction of this interaction to symbol manipulation within the 
device. He writes: ‘The machine, of course, follows its proscribed program only, 
which […] may be considered undeterministic by humans.’ Because users interact 
with the system, and do not know the internal structure, there is a renewed source for 
non-determinism, as there was at the knowledge level in the design. The knowledge 
level allows non-determinism in the interaction between the system and the designer. 
In the same sense is there non-determinism in the interaction as a sign process 
between the system and the user. 
A model for free will in intelligent machines 
To integrate both the knowledge and symbol levels in the design context and the sign 
and signal processes in the use context, we may draw a new diagram of the two upper 
levels of the design hierarchy, and add the context of use on the right side. As well as 
the symbol level is a symbolic representation which makes the computer understand 
the knowledge level in design, is the user interface a symbolic representation which 
makes the computer understand the dialogue level in the functioning context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
knowledge level 
symbol level user interface level 
dialogue level 
Design context 
non-deterministic 
Use context 
deterministic 
Figure 1: Interaction levels in intelligent systems 
The dialogue level is the level where users interact with the system in a sign process. 
The user interface is a symbolic level, which implements this interaction. Thus, both 
the symbol level and the user interface level form symbolic representations of the 
non-deterministic levels above. In a design context, non-determinism means that the 
knowledge level does not necessarily define all behaviour. In a functioning context, 
the user does not necessarily expect defined behaviour, because he does not know the 
internal structure of the system. The non-determinism resides in the relation between 
the user and the system, which defines the interaction context for both the machine 
and the user. In this interaction context, the user expects the machine to influence the 
interaction, not to show its defined behaviour. This means that in a social context 
machines seem to have something like free will. But this is not just a personification 
of a machine by innocent users, because it is a necessary assumption in meaningful 
social interaction with machines. 
 
The relevance of this model lies in the two interaction points that are defined between 
an intelligent system and the human world. In the design context, this interaction 
takes place at the knowledge level. In the use context, this interaction takes place at 
the dialogue level. Both levels are in some sense non-deterministic and allow 
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ascribing free will to both the machine and the people that interact with it. The source 
of the non-determinism and of ascribing free will to both people and machine is their 
relation. 
Intelligent machines and free will 
Conclusions 
We have looked at the concept of machine free will from three different perspectives: 
1. The necessity of the concept of free will in social interactions that require 
decision-making. 
2. Free will as a relational concept: the tension between what an actor ‘can’ do 
and what he actually ‘will’ do. 
3. The interaction points in the design and use context that allow non-
determinism. 
The relations between these three viewpoints can be described as follows. The 
necessity of ascribing free will to social actors seems to be counter-intuitive when it is 
applied to machines. It turns out, however, that we can view machine free will as a 
tension between what an agent can do and what it actually will do. This is the same as 
the social view on human free will, where we attribute free will to humans because 
meaningful social interactions require choices. This relational concept of free will can 
be used in analysing systems by defining the interaction points between a machine 
and the environment, which are the knowledge level in design and the dialogue level 
in use. The free will thus resides in the relations between the machine and the 
environment, which define the interaction contexts in design and use. 
Philosophical questions 
In our social approach, we accept that free will is a concept that arises out of 
relational issues, and we do not make a distinction between human free will arising 
from moral or societal issues and machine free will as I described it in the previous 
paragraphs. Free will is in both cases a relational concept that arises out of a tension 
between what an actor ‘can’ do and what it actually ‘will’ do. We will meet this 
symmetry between humans and artefacts again later in this study. What we must 
concentrate on now is the philosophical questions that are raised by the notion that 
free will is a concept that for machines as well as for humans is emerging from their 
relations with an environment, in particular relations between human actors and 
intelligent machines. For the latter type of relations determines the functioning 
context for both the intelligent machine and the people that work with it. 
 
Two theories in philosophy of technology are well suited for tackling questions on 
relations between humans and technology. The first is the Actor-Network Theory as 
introduced by Bruno Latour, the second is a phenomenological view, and is defended 
by authors as Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek, who rather call their approach 
postphenomenology. Before we can use these theories, which are both focussed on the 
behaviour of concrete technological artefacts, we must have a more concrete 
representation of an intelligent machine. Therefore, I will first present an empirical 
analysis of one particular intelligent machine. This will be the CREEK system, 
developed by Agnar Aamodt and others at NTNU in Trondheim, Norway. This 
system uses a case-based reasoning approach to artificial intelligence. 
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What follows is an analysis of the case-based reasoning approach and the CREEK 
system in particular. First, an overview and analysis of this system is presented. The 
approach is put in context of the known AI paradigms. Thereafter, I use the actor-
network theory to clarify the relationships between intelligent machines and their 
environment, concentrating on free will issues and the CREEK system. A well-known 
critique of the actor-network approach is the lack of possibilities for moral evaluation. 
This is resolved by introducing the postphenomenological view, which in some way 
can be seen as a complement of the actor-network approach, in the sense that is has a 
narrower focus but a deeper analysis. In comparison of the two theories with respect 
to case-based reasoning, I hope to construct a systematic view on the position of these 
systems in AI and their possibilities and limitations, as seen from the social 
perspective on free will. 
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5 The Case-Based Reasoning paradigm 
In this chapter, I give an overview of the paradigm of case-based reasoning (CBR) 
within the area of artificial intelligence. First, the context of CBR is sketched, in terms 
of assumptions, motivations and view on intelligence. Then, modelling issues within 
the CBR paradigm are discussed. The third part of the chapter is concerned with the 
CREEK system, as developed at the University of Trondheim. Case-based reasoning 
thus provides a case for the philosophical analysis in the following chapters. In this 
chapter, some philosophical questions are posed as entries into such an analysis. 
Context of Case-Based Reasoning 
Assumptions 
In the second chapter, we mentioned that Dreyfus saw as one of the assumptions of 
symbolic AI that reasoning is viewed as rule-based symbol manipulation (the 
psychological assumption). The paradigm of case-based reasoning drops this 
assumption. Instead of rules, reasoning is based on a memory of stored cases. In CBR, 
reasoning is based on remembering. In solving a problem, the most relevant cases are 
retrieved and adapted to the new situation. CBR introduces two new assumptions 
(Leake, 1996): 
• the world is regular: similar problems have similar solutions 
• the types of problems an agent encounter tend to recur 
 
The first question that is raised, is the relation of these assumptions to the view of 
Dreyfus. While Dreyfus analysed symbolic AI as needing formalizable knowledge 
and a formalizable reality (the epistemological and ontological assumption, 
respectively), case-based reasoning assumes regularity instead of formalizability. 
CBR needs both a regular world and knowledge that can be represented in a form that 
shows regularity. In this way, it is guaranteed that cases have relevance for future 
problem solving. I view the assumption of regularity as the first core characteristic of 
CBR. 
By assuming regularity instead of formalizability, case-based reasoning unties itself 
from the rationalistic tradition in philosophy. Instead, a connection may be observed 
between CBR and the empiristic tradition. For example, Hume (1886) defended the 
theory that what we see as laws of nature are in fact notions that are based on the life-
long observation of cases, not on unbreakable rules.  
Motivations 
The motivations to develop CBR-technology are largely the same as for classical AI. 
There is both a desire to model human behaviour and a desire to make effective AI 
systems. The problems of classical AI that might to some extent be tackled by the 
CBR approach include (Leake, 1996): 
1. knowledge acquisition: it may be easier to get access to cases than to elicit 
rules 
2. knowledge maintenance: possibility of incremental learning by adding cases 
3. increasing problem-solving efficiency: problem solving can be based on prior 
reasoning instead of repeating the effort 
4. increasing quality of solutions: rules may have imperfections that can be 
avoided by taking prior cases into account 
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5. user acceptance: ‘To trust the system’s conclusions, a user may need to be 
convinced that they are derived in a reasonable way.’ The user will be more 
convinced by reference to prior cases than to rules that may not be clear to the 
user. 
Especially the last point is interesting from a philosophical point of view: How can we 
build intelligent systems that are accepted as decision partners by their users? Aamodt 
(1991) writes: ‘It is a reasonable assumption that the users of data interpretation or 
decision support systems are more likely to accept a system with some weaknesses, as 
long as the system is able to improve over time. And particularly so, if the system is 
able to interact with the user in an intelligible way.’ (p. 19). 
 
Case-based reasoning can be used in application domains that are open and have a 
weak theory. An open domain is a domain which cannot be realistically modelled 
unless the problem solver’s relationships with the external, changing world are 
anticipated by the model; a weak theory domain is a domain in which relationships 
between important concepts are uncertain, in contrast to e.g. mathematical domains 
(Aamodt, 1994). Because of the uncertainties in the domain, the truth of statements 
cannot be guaranteed. This means that truth-preserving inference and deduction are 
not the suitable means for reasoning. 
Because of the involvement of open and weak theory domains, plausibility and 
probability enter into the reasoning process in problem solving. The truth preserving 
deduction inference process is to some extent replaced by abduction and/or induction. 
Abduction, also known as inference to the best explanation, takes a list of symptoms 
and finds the most plausible explanation for the situation. In induction, a general 
conclusion is derived from multiple individual statements. 
Problem solving and learning 
In CBR, both problem solving and learning are considered essential tasks. In fact, 
they are seen as complementary issues: ‘Complementary with the principle of 
reasoning by remembering is the principle that reasoning is remembered’ (Leake, 
1996), ‘Learning in CBR occurs as a natural by-product of problem solving.’ 
(Aamodt, 1994). I consider this mutual dependency of problem solving and learning 
the second core characteristic of CBR. From a philosophical point of view, the 
question may be asked what the consequences are of such a view on intelligence. 
 
In finding a problem-solving strategy for CBR-systems, Aamodt (1991, p. 58) 
suggests that ‘a computational model for robust problem solving in real world 
complex domains should to some extent take advantage of existing theories of human 
problem solving.’ He defines this as a pragmatic consideration for building computer-
based problem solvers at an expert level. The following three phases of problem 
solving are suggested: 
1. understanding the problem 
2. generating plausible solutions 
3. selecting a good solution 
Learning also has three phases: 
1. extracting learning sources 
2. constructing new knowledge structures 
3. storing and indexing 
These models of problem solving and learning will be used in the philosophical 
analysis in the following chapters. 
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Modelling issues 
Leake (1996) distinguishes between interpretative CBR and problem-solving CBR. In 
interpretative systems, the goal is classifying a situation by means of prior cases. In 
problem-solving systems, the goal is suggesting a solution for a particular situation. 
This raises a question about the nature of such tasks, and the relationship between the 
two system classes. Which are the characteristics of interpretative and problem-
solving tasks and what does it mean that they are done by machines? 
 
The main focus of this paper is on decision-making systems, so I will concentrate on 
problem-solving CBR. According to Leake, case-based problem-solving can be seen 
as ‘exploiting the relationship between two different types of similarity’. When there 
is a similarity between the input problem and some cases, a complementary similarity 
is assumed between the target solution and the case solutions, as depicted in the figure 
below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: How case-based problem-solving generates a new solution (Leake, 1996) 
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I will analyse this figure as follows. In the interpretation of a problem, cases are 
retrieved that are somehow similar in the problem description space. These are the 
possibilities of the situation (i.e. the stored cases that may be used for assessing the 
situation). Then, a mapping takes place to the solution space. In the solution space, we 
find the alternatives of decision (i.e. the solutions to solved cases that may be used to 
construct a decision). The suggestion of a solution is the final product of the process. 
Possibilities thus describe the nature of the situation, alternatives the decisions of the 
agent. 
Because case-based reasoning requires both problem solving and learning, and these 
processes are complementary, there is also a two-way connection between the 
possibilities in the problem description space (interpretation) and the solution space 
(decision). Thus, next to the regularity assumption and the complementarity of 
problem solving and learning, a third characteristic of decision-making CBR is the 
inherent connection between possibilities and alternatives, or in a different 
formulation, the connection between interpretation and decision. 
We have met this idea before when we discussed the roots of machine free will: the 
connection between ‘can’ and ‘will’. In CBR, an agent explicitly assesses what its 
possibilities are in a certain situation, by interpreting the situation in terms of past 
experiences (problem description space). What it will do depends on its decision in 
terms of solutions of previous problems (solution space). Thus, in CBR, the tension 
between ‘can’ and ‘will’ is made explicit. 
 
The main steps in the CBR problem-solving process are defined by Aamodt (1994, 
1995): 
1. RETRIEVE the most similar case or cases 
2. REUSE the information and knowledge in that case to solve the problem 
3. REVISE the proposed solution 
4. RETAIN the parts of this experience likely to be useful for future problem 
solving 
The problem areas in case-based reasoning are the methods associated with these four 
system activities. An additional problem area is the knowledge representation, which 
forms the basis for the reasoning performed during problem solving. The relations 
between the processes need to be further clarified to be able to relate this view on the 
problem-solving process to philosophical views on the relations between the system 
and the environment. 
The CREEK system 
Requirements 
Aamodt (1991) defines three criteria for systems that are intended to continually learn 
through experience in knowledge-rich environments: 
 
R1. Expressive and extendible knowledge representation formalism, enabling an 
explicit and thorough modelling of relevant knowledge types. 
 
R2. Problem solving and reasoning methods that are able to effectively combine 
reasoning from past cases with reasoning within a competent and robust model 
of more general domain knowledge. 
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R3. A learning method that is able to retain concrete problem solving experiences, 
and integrate each experience into the knowledge model in a way that 
gradually improves knowledge quality and problem solving performance. 
 
The CREEK system (Aamodt, 1991, 1994, 1995) is based on these criteria and 
focuses on two aspects of CBR: 
• integration of case-based methods and general domain knowledge 
• interaction with the user during the problem-solving process 
 
The first of these aspects is based on results from psychology and philosophy, which 
show that human expert problem solving is to a large degree associational. This 
means that no elaborate reasoning steps are involved, but only associations with 
stored observations. On the contrary, novices tend to use elaborative reasoning, using 
theoretical knowledge about the domain. An expert system in a knowledge-intensive 
environment therefore needs to have access to both types of problem solving, and 
move to the expert level by remembering and using experiences. This makes it 
possible to build a system able to function at an expert level without covering the full 
complexity of the domain at design. 
The second aspect relies on the view of apprenticeship learning. This means that an 
expert system learns by observing the user’s way of problem solving and asking 
questions if it is uncertain about decisions. Therefore, the system needs to interact 
with the user during the problem-solving process. Moreover, if the system can 
perform meaningful interaction with the user, the user is more likely to accept the 
system. 
The first aspect (integration of case-based methods and general domain knowledge) 
will be covered in a description of the architecture of the system. Thereafter, we focus 
on the second aspect, the interaction. 
Architecture 
The CREEK system consists of four modules, built on a common Conceptual 
Knowledge Fundament. With respect to the application domain, there is an Object 
level Knowledge Model and an Application Strategy Model. On a meta-level, we find 
the Combined Reasoning Model and the Sustained Learning Model. 
Conceptual Knowledge Fundament 
Underlying the CREEK modules there is a Conceptual Knowledge Fundament. This 
fundament is based on a network view of knowledge and implemented using a frame 
structure. This means that there is no a priori distinction between different types of 
knowledge, although knowledge may include cases, rules, general domain concepts 
and methods. Entities and relations are explicitly defined whenever there is need for 
reasoning about them. Relations form the basis for the network and define the 
meaning of the concepts. The primitives underlying the relational structure are 
defined in terms of the Lisp language. 
Object level Knowledge Model 
The Object level Knowledge Model contains cases and object level rules. It forms the 
basis for the problem solving and learning processes. The conceptual model is also 
considered part of this module. This means that knowledge for the three types of 
reasoning used by the Combined Reasoning Model (see below) is available 
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(knowledge of cases, domain knowledge, and rules). The Object level Knowledge 
Model is represented in the functional architecture by an object knowledge base. 
Application Strategy Model 
The problem solving process is represented by the Application Strategy Model1. It 
makes decisions about the knowledge to use and the methods to invoke to verify 
hypotheses. The strategy depends on the application domain. 
Combined Reasoning Model 
The four main phases of problem solving are implemented using reasoning based on 
an explanation engine structure. This structure defines three sub-processes of 
reasoning: 
1. activating knowledge structures 
2. explaining candidate facts 
3. focusing on a conclusion 
The Combined Reasoning Model can decide to use three reasoning methods: case-
based reasoning, model-based reasoning (based on general domain knowledge) and 
rule-based reasoning (based on heuristic rules). Because it reasons about concepts in 
the system and not within the environment, it is considered a meta-level model. 
Sustained Learning Model 
The Sustained Learning Model contains algorithms for learning and rules for updating 
the knowledge structure. Both case-based learning and explanation-based learning 
may be used. It is also considered a meta-level model, for it does not depend on 
domain-specific knowledge. 
Interaction 
There are three main interaction moments between the user and the CREEK system 
during the problem solving process. First, the user has to define the problem. After the 
system has tried to solve the problem and has suggested solutions, the user is required 
to choose the definitive solution. Third, the user is asked for the importance of the 
different findings to the solution of the case. With regard to the explanations the 
system gives for the various features, the user should be able to reject unsound 
explanations. Therefore, it is important that the user is able to understand the 
explanations the system uses to justify the case selection and adaptation. 
Next to the common use, there is a possibility for experts to inspect and adapt the 
network of knowledge. The viewing system allows for inspection of implications of 
diagnoses by certain findings, and solutions to the stored cases. 
Conclusions 
We have defined three core characteristics of the case-based reasoning paradigm in 
artificial intelligence: 
1. the assumption of regularity, both in the environment and in the agent 
2. the complementarity of reasoning and remembering, or problem solving and 
learning 
3. the inherent connection between possibilities and alternatives, or interpretation 
and decision 
                                                 
1 formerly known as Diagnosis and Repair Model (Aamodt, 1995 and 1991, respectively) 
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We have discussed the CREEK system as a concrete example within the CBR 
paradigm. CREEK focuses on: 
• integration of case-based methods and general domain knowledge 
• interaction with the user during the problem-solving process 
This is realized by an architecture that integrates different methods of reasoning and 
learning, and an apprenticeship way of involving the user in the decision-making 
process. 
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6 The actor-network approach 
In this chapter, I describe the actor-network approach in philosophy, as introduced by 
Bruno Latour (e.g. Latour, 1997). I focus on the four dimensions of Latour’s theory as 
described by Peter-Paul Verbeek (Verbeek, 2000, chapter 6). After that, I apply this 
theory to the case-based reasoning paradigm in artificial intelligence by relating the 
four dimensions to the description I gave of case-based reasoning in the previous 
chapter. I will try to clarify the relations between a CBR system and its designers and 
users. 
The Actor-Network Theory 
The Actor-Network Theory, as formulated by Bruno Latour, focuses on relations 
between an actor and the network around it. Actors can be both humans and 
technological artefacts. The network consists of the relations that are formed with 
other actors in the environment. The approach tries to avoid reducing technology 
either to material issues or to human decisions. Therefore, the concept of actant is 
introduced to include both human actors and artefacts. By the forming of relations 
between actants, a technology becomes what it is. This process is describable in four 
dimensions, derived from Verbeek (2000). Verbeek focuses in this description on the 
mediation of acting by technology. The dimensions are translation, composition, 
reversible blackboxing and delegation. 
Translation 
Humans usually have intentions to act. This can be called an acting programme. 
When we consider humans and artefacts symmetrically, this also goes for 
technologies. When relations are formed between actants, the acting programme 
changes. This is called translation. An example is the relation between a man and a 
gun. If the man was intended to revenge himself, this becomes a different programme 
together with the gun, because the gun changes the way in which the goal can be 
reached. In the same sense, the gun is no longer the same in relation with the man, 
because the man changes the way it is used. Actants only exist in relation with each 
other, they have no such thing as an ‘essence’. By forming relations, their acting 
programme becomes translated. 
Composition 
At the same time, the actants become coupled to each other. This is called 
composition. Acting is not a property of humans, but of a chain of actants, which in 
their relations form the acting programme. It is not the gun that is wholly responsible 
for shooting, but neither is the man, because he would have acted differently if he did 
not have this gun. Together with the translation of acting programmes, mediation can 
be described in the two dimensions of substitution and association. Association 
covers the composition of chains of actants, substitution the translation of the acting 
programme. 
Reversible blackboxing 
By forming chains of actants, their individual properties and relations become hidden. 
This is called blackboxing. This process is reversible. For example, a computer 
system consists of relations between hardware components, software components, 
network architecture, maintenance and support facilities, etc. Usually this is hidden in 
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the use of the computer. But if a computer stops functioning, we have to think of the 
components that are involved and the people behind the scene (e.g. system 
administrators). We may have to call a mechanic to fix the problem, which opens the 
black box even more. 
Delegation 
In trying to change acting programmes of people, designers of technology may 
intentionally inscribe properties into artefacts to force this change. This is called 
delegation. One can think of different measures to slow down the traffic in a city. The 
material which causes the acting programme of drivers to change can range from 
signs via police intervention to actually rebuilding the road in a way that makes it 
impossible to drive faster without damaging the car. It is possible to design a 
technology in a way that prescribes a certain use. The whole of prescriptions included 
in an artefact is called a script. A script does not need to be unavoidable. Users need 
to subscribe to the script to be affected by the intended use. 
Actants in case-based reasoning 
In this part of the chapter, I will use the four described dimensions to analyse case-
based reasoning from an actor-network perspective. The translation dimension is 
focused on decision making, the composition dimension on intelligence, the 
blackboxing dimension on consciousness and the delegation dimension on free will. 
Translation of decision-making 
Decision-making is characterized by a choice among different alternatives by an 
expert. This expert disposes of a memory and reasoning system (contained in what we 
call his brain) which makes it possible to make this decision. Because the human 
expert has a task to perform, he intends to make the decision. The intentions to decide 
form the acting programme of decision-making. 
When we introduce intelligent machines into decision-making processes, the acting 
programme changes. Because of the different possibilities the machine has to offer 
(for example a larger and more precise memory, or a more rational reasoning system), 
the intentions of decision-making become different. The human expert is no longer 
alone in having to cope with performing the acting. In analogy with the man and the 
gun, the decision-making system mediates the way in which the goal of acting (the 
decision) is reached, in the same way the gun mediates the way in which the man 
revenges himself. 
The introduction of intelligent systems in decision-making thus mediates and thereby 
changes the way in which decisions are made. The forming of a relation between the 
human decision-makers and the system translates the acting programme of decision 
making. The decision-making process is translated to a new level. Also, the machine 
is changed by the forming of the relation. An intelligent machine is not the same in a 
decision-making environment, in the same way as the gun is not the same in a 
revenging environment. 
 
We can try to figure out in which way case-based reasoning systems translate 
decision-making by focusing on the three characteristics we defined in the previous 
chapter: 
1. the assumption of regularity, both in the environment and in the agent 
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2. the complementarity of reasoning and remembering, or problem solving and 
learning 
3. (problem-solving CBR) the inherent connection between possibilities and 
alternatives, or interpretation and decision 
The first assumption defines the decision-making process in terms of regularities. This 
reduces the importance of explicit rules, because they are assumed to be only present 
in the form of regularities in the environment, not as justifiable laws (Hume). In 
CREEK, the total reliance on regularities is avoided by using general domain 
knowledge in explanations and in situations where cases cannot provide a reliable 
answer. Moreover, it is possible for the user to reject unsound explanations. Thus, the 
translation of the decision-making process to finding regularities in its pure form is 
prevented. 
The second assumption means that both reasoning and remembering are subject to 
machine mediation, which may be considered different from rule-based AI systems, 
that model explicit knowledge without remembering cases. The possibility of machine 
memory (in the sense of learning memory) improves the possibility of finding 
regularities as assumed by the first characteristic, because human memory is more 
subject to errors and missing data. In CREEK, all knowledge is represented in a single 
semantic network. CREEK therefore translates the decision process to an integrated 
approach instead of relying on separated frameworks. 
The third assumption mediates the decision-making process by amplifying the relation 
between interpretation and decision, which may be only unconsciously present in 
human decision-making. The CREEK system performs this translation by explicitly 
remembering previously solved cases and errors, which can directly be used in new 
situations. Experiences from the solution space are thus used in the problem 
description space when interpreting new situations, while the interpretation directly 
matches to alternatives in the solution space. 
 
We thus see that case-based reasoning systems translate the decision-making process 
by: 
1. stimulating reasoning based on regularities instead of explicit rules 
2. enhancing memory capabilities which form the basis for finding regularities 
3. amplifying the relation between interpretation and decision 
The first two mediation aspects are clearly related, in the sense that they are mutually 
dependent. The relation with the third aspect will be discussed in the next chapter. We 
conclude that the acting programme of decision-making process is changed by 
introducing case-based reasoning systems, because the introduction of these systems 
translates the decision-making process. The new decision-making entity is the whole 
of humans and machines involved. 
Composition of intelligence 
The coupling of actants in decision-making environments can be described by using 
the conceptual model from chapter 4. The acting programme of decision making is 
formed by a chain of designers, the intelligent system, and users. 
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Figure 3: The intelligence chain 
Designers, system and users all are involved in the decision-making process. The 
relations between the designers and the system are defined at the knowledge level, the 
relations between the users and the system at the dialogue level. The interaction at 
these non-deterministic levels determines the way in which the acting programme of 
decision-making becomes translated. The intelligence thus resides in the whole chain 
of actants. 
 
We can now describe the dimensions of association and substitution in artificial 
intelligence: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
substitution 
(OR) 
association (AND) 
intelligence chain 2 (e.g. rule-based system) 
intelligence chain 3 (e.g. neural system) 
intelligence chain 4 (e.g. CREEK) 
intelligence chain 1 (e.g. human decision-making) 
 
Figure 4: Association and substitution in artificial intelligence 
 
In the association dimension, we find the connections in the intelligence chain. The 
way the actants are coupled defines the structure of the composition. In the 
substitution dimension, we find the different possibilities for these chains to translate 
the decision-making process. The different intelligent chains are formed by the 
associations of the actants involved in the intelligent systems. What is specific for the 
systems are the interactions at the knowledge level in design and the dialogue level in 
use, that define how the intelligence chain is formed and thereby the way in which the 
decision-making process is mediated. The different systems each translate the 
decision-making process in a different way. Thus, there is a choice between different 
systems and their intelligence chains (OR), while within a system there is a coupling 
of involved actants that form the acting programme (AND). 
 
For analysing a concrete system such as CREEK, we have to focus on the interactions 
in both the design and the use context. The design interactions consist of the 
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architecture on the knowledge level. The use interactions include the dialogue 
processes in the use of the system. These interactions transfer intelligence through the 
intelligence chain. Moreover, I will argue that it is possible to transfer free will 
through the chain. 
The interaction between the designer and the system lies mainly in the type of 
knowing and reasoning that is ‘transferred’. This means that when the designer forms 
the system at the knowledge level, he also forms the way in which the system is 
intelligent, and thereby the way the system translates the decision-making process. 
Typical for CREEK is that all knowledge is represented in a single semantic network. 
This allows for interaction between the designer and the system in an integrated way, 
without distinction between different types of knowledge. The combination of 
different reasoning methods makes it possible to have the system operate with more 
or less the same methods humans have at their disposal. The designer therefore leaves 
a lot of ‘freedom’ for the system to define its own contribution in the decision-making 
process. 
Next to the integration of case-based reasoning and general domain knowledge, the 
second main focus of CREEK is the interaction between the system and the user. Of 
course the user interface is defined in the design process too, but this is also the point 
where the system and the user are connected in the intelligence chain. Therefore, the 
intelligence and freedom that are transferred in the chain are also visible at this point. 
If the system in its turn leaves some freedom to the user to cooperate in the decision-
making process, the chain becomes better connected and the user will feel more 
comfortable with the process. So, intelligence is not only transferred from the 
designer to the system, but also from the system to the user and from the user back to 
the system. In CREEK, this is achieved by the interactions in problem formulation, 
solution selection and definition of the importance of case features. 
Blackboxing of consciousness 
When a man with a gun revenges himself by shooting his rival, it is not quite clear 
which part of the act is due to the man and which part to the gun. Defenders of 
weapon industries might argue that is the man that shoots and the gun is just a means, 
while opponents of weapon possession might argue that guns invite to shoot people. 
Of course, there is some truth in both. But in an actual case, it is difficult to figure out 
to what extent both the actants are responsible. The individual properties of the 
actants become hidden in their relation. 
Because of the coupling of humans and decision-making systems in the intelligence 
chain, their individual properties become hidden when viewing the decision-making 
process from the outside. The only thing observable is that decisions are made by 
some network of actants. The internal structure is not known, unless something goes 
wrong and requires reopening the black box. The main statement here is that we 
cannot observe where the consciousness of decision making resides. It can be in any 
place in the intelligence chain that forms the decision-making acting programme. 
Therefore, we cannot distinguish a priori between the different actants involved in the 
process. 
Delegation of free will 
When we are talking about free will and intelligent machines, the question is raised 
how this relates to the actor-network analysis given here. What I showed before, is 
that we must ascribe the property of free will to actors in a meaningful society, 
especially when choices or decisions are involved. The problem is that we cannot 
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distinguish between humans and systems in the blackboxed intelligence chain. 
Therefore, we must ascribe the free will concept to the whole chain. Again, the 
interactions between the different actants form the locations where free will issues can 
be observed. It is thus important that intelligent systems are designed so that they act 
like they have free will. This makes it both possible to have a meaningful decision-
making process without having to know where the consciousness of decision-making 
resides, and allows for meaningful interaction between the different decision-making 
actants. 
According to the actor-network theory, we can inscribe properties into artefacts to 
change the decision-making programme in which they function. If we want intelligent 
machines to function in a meaningful decision-making programme in which free will 
must be included, we must try to inscribe this property into these machines whenever 
we need to ascribe the property. This view makes it possible to talk about modelling 
free will, which is difficult in other philosophical approaches. 
Free will issues thus become a part of the script of an AI system. A technology can 
prescribe a certain use by means of the script. As I have shown in precious chapters, 
human interaction requires thinking in terms of free will. We could state that this is 
part of the script of a human, a prescription for ‘using’ him or her. In the same way 
that human behaviour prescribes ‘use’ in terms of free will, we can make machine 
behaviour prescribe this kind of use. Thus, we model the script of AI systems to the 
characteristics of the human script. We avoid discussing physical conditions and 
transcendental presumptions of free will or human behaviour in general in this way. 
 
The concept of script allows for modelling free will issues, which makes the decision 
processes in the intelligence chain acceptable and makes it easier for humans to 
subscribe to the script of AI systems, because humans always expect to interact in 
terms of meaningful signs. We therefore take a look at the design context to see how 
this can be implemented. 
Design issues 
In the intelligence chain, properties of decision-making are transferred between the 
different actants. In the design interaction at the knowledge level, the system is 
defined in terms of knowledge and reasoning. In the use interaction at the dialogue 
level, the system exhibits a certain behaviour. The designer therefore needs to interact 
at the knowledge level in a way that makes it possible for the user to interact at the 
dialogue level in a meaningful way. This connects the intelligence chain and makes it 
possible to view the whole intelligence chain as a blackboxed consciousness without 
having to worry about the nature of the process. 
 
The same I said about the transfer (or delegation) of intelligence in the intelligence 
chain goes for the free will property. If the designer leaves freedom to the system to 
decide its own contribution, it is also possible for the system to leave freedom to the 
user. If the system is fixed by unbreakable rules, there is no point in interacting with 
the user. The free will the designer transfers to and inscribes in the system can be 
made visible in the interaction with the user. This means that the designer has the 
possibility to design the system in such a way that the free will property becomes 
visible at the dialogue level. Because humans only know meaningful interactions 
(sign processes) and the nature of the decision-making process requires the concept of 
free will, the designer must take the responsibility to build systems that show such 
behaviour. 
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Case-based reasoning is a good example of a system class that in a way implements 
this design. When allowing a machine to include its own experiences in its reasoning, 
it becomes possible for the machine to interact with its environment, including the 
user. In CREEK, this is achieved by allowing different types of reasoning, which may 
include asking the user about uncertainties. The user then becomes involved in the 
process in a meaningful interaction, and can subscribe to the script without having to 
reconsider the meaningful interaction he or she is used to have with other humans. 
Humans do not need to reconsider their interaction processes in terms of free will 
when confronted with systems that have been inscribed the free will property in 
design. 
Conclusions 
We have described case-based reasoning from an actor-network perspective. By using 
intelligent machines in decision-making processes, the processes are translated. Both 
the human decision-makers and the machines are changed by the relations they get 
involved in. The decision-making becomes an action of a composition of humans and 
machines, in which they chain their intelligence. In this process, the residence of the 
consciousness becomes hidden by blackboxing of the whole decision-making process. 
 
As free will is a necessary presumption for our society we cannot have the decision-
making process be without free will. Therefore, we have to ascribe the property of 
free will to both human decision-makers and decision support systems, which together 
form the acting in decision-making. Besides, the user will not subscribe to a script that 
does not include meaningful interactions. In design, this means inscribing the free will 
property into the machines to both allow the user to have meaningful interactions and 
make the decision-making process acceptable for society. 
 
Case-based reasoning translates the decision-making process by:  
1. stimulating reasoning based on regularities instead of explicit rules 
2. enhancing memory capabilities which form the basis for finding regularities 
3. amplifying the relation between interpretation and decision 
CBR allows for inscribing free will by having the system include its own experiences. 
In CREEK, this becomes visible in using different reasoning methods in interaction 
with the user. 
 
The actor-network theory does not allow for moral evaluation of the introduction of 
intelligent machines in decision-making processes. Moreover, there is no way to 
assess the prescriptions for delegating the free will property to machines. In the next 
chapter, the postfenomenological perspective will be used to address these questions. 
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7 The phenomenological approach 
Phenomenology is a philosophical trend that focuses on relations between humans 
and their reality. There are two ways to use the phenomenological approach in the 
analysis of intelligent machines. First, we can describe how these machines change 
the relations between humans and the world. Second, we can describe machines as 
related to their reality in the same way we do this for humans. This requires viewing 
the machine as being-in-the-world itself. I will start the chapter with an introduction 
into postphenomenology and then describe the two approaches. 
Postphenomenology 
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the phenomenological trend in 
philosophy. Authors like Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek use the ideas of the 
phenomenological philosophers to describe the influence of technology in our life. I 
will use these ideas to clarify the relations between case-based reasoning systems and 
their environment. First, we take a look at the postphenomenological approach, 
starting with a characterization of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology 
Phenomenology as a philosophical trend was initialised by Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938) with the famous credo ‘zu den Sachen selbst’. He marked the starting of the 
twentieth century with a slogan that was meant to ‘bracket existence’ and concentrate 
on the directedness of consciousness towards the world. This directedness was called 
intentionality. The focus on the relation between the consciousness and the world 
meant an alternative for the classic extremes of idealism and realism, of which the 
first gave priority to consciousness and the second to the world in questions about 
knowing. In other words, phenomenology did not argue that either the world or 
consciousness was the source of knowing, but asserted that it was in the intentionality 
that they were related and formed the basis of knowledge. 
The hermeneutic and existential perspectives 
Although phenomenology was originally concerned with questions about knowing the 
world, its perspective was broadened both by the late Husserl and other 
phenomenological philosophers as Heidegger and Jaspers. This is mainly due to the 
influence of existential philosophy, as founded by Kierkegaard. The field of 
phenomenology was broadened from the issue of knowing and consciousness to 
relations between humans and their world in general. The main theme taken from 
Kierkegaard was the notion that people not only interpret the world, but also form 
their existence. 
With this broadening of the phenomenological task, it becomes possible to discern 
two perspectives in phenomenology (Verbeek, 1999 and Verbeek, 2000). The first is 
the hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective, which analyses the interpretation of 
the world by humans and the meaning it has. The second is the existential-
phenomenological perspective, which is concerned with how people form their 
existence. 
Postphenomenology 
‘Postphenomenology can be seen as an approach rooted in phenomenology that 
shares the postmodern dislike of the existence of context-independent truths and the 
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radical separation of subject and object, but does not want to translate this into 
indifferent relativism.’ (Verbeek, 2000, chapter 4) 2
 
Postphenomenology is a word introduced by Don Ihde, a philosopher who tried to 
apply the old phenomenological ideas to technology. Peter-Paul Verbeek (Verbeek, 
2000) uses the word in a broader sense, in constructing a perspective on the influence 
of technologies in human life. There are two main demands on such a perspective. 
First, it has to avoid reducing technology to its transcendental presumptions, like 
many early philosophers of technology did (as explained in chapter 1). Second, it has 
to allow for evaluation of the influence of technologies, which means a different 
approach than constructivism as in the Actor-Network Theory. For in the latter 
approaches, there is no room for evaluating the role of the artefacts in hermeneutic or 
existential processes, and this would mean denial of the evaluative perspectives of the 
early philosophers. 
These demands are met by using a phenomenological approach to the influence of 
technology. In phenomenology, we can study the relations between humans and the 
world and we can observe the role of technologies in these relations. Technologies 
can both mediate the way people act and form their existence (existential perspective) 
and change the way in which people have access to and interpret reality (hermeneutic 
perspective). This mediation forms the basis for evaluative questions, whereas the 
actor-network theory just describes the relations without addressing existential or 
hermeneutic questions. 
 
‘A postphenomenological ‘turn towards the things’ in philosophy of technology 
should […] exist in analysing the mediating role of technological artefacts in the 
relation between humans and their reality.’ (Verbeek, 2000, chapter 4) 3
 
The mediating character of technologies is covered by the concept of technological 
intentionality (Ihde, 1990, p. 141). This means that they have directedness in the sense 
that they form the way they are used by mediating the relation between humans and 
the world. In this sense, the concept relates to the notion script in the actor-network 
theory. This will be the approach in the part of the chapter about machines as 
mediators. But Ihde also uses the term technological intentionality in the sense of 
directedness of technologies to certain aspects of reality (Verbeek, 2000, chapter 4, 
note 13). For example, a tape recorder has an intentionality towards sound, which is 
different from that of humans, because it records both foreground and background 
sounds. Artefacts thus are related to reality themselves. This sense of technological 
intentionality forms the basis for the part of the chapter about machines as minds. 
Machines as mediators 
By introducing intelligent machines into decision-making processes, it is not only the 
acting programme that is changed. Also, the relation between the humans involved 
and their reality is mediated. In artificial intelligence, we can analyse this mediation 
by looking at the nature of the intelligence chain in different systems. In this part of 
                                                 
2 ‘Postfenomenologie kan gezien worden als een op de fenomenologie geënte benadering die de 
postmoderne afkeer van het bestaan van contextonafhankelijke waarheden en de radicale scheiding van 
subject en object deelt, maar niet wil vertalen in onverschillig relativisme.’ 
3 ‘Een postfenomenologische ‘wending naar de dingen’ in de techniekfilosofie zou […] moeten bestaan 
in het analyseren van de bemiddelende rol van technologische artefacten in de relatie tussen mensen en 
hun werkelijkheid.’ 
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the chapter, I will try to describe this mediation both from the hermeneutic and from 
the existential perspective in postphenomenology. 
 
From a hermeneutic perspective, mediation consists of amplification and reduction of 
aspects of the interpretation of reality (Ihde, 1990). Technologies can amplify or 
reduce elements of experience by changing the relation between humans and the 
world. A simple example is the use of binoculars, which amplify a part of reality, but 
reduce other parts by taking away the rest of the view. This also goes in a more 
symbolic way for other technologies. I wrote before about mediation of human 
experience by elements in the landscape (Pieters, 2000). 
In case-based reasoning, we saw that the paradigm assumes regularity in both the 
environment and the agent. This means that when a case-based reasoning system is 
introduced in decision making, it mediates the relation between the humans and the 
decision-making environment by amplifying the aspects of interpretation that relate to 
regularity. In the same way, it reduces other aspects that we may value in decision-
making. The achievement of the CREEK system is that it includes different types of 
knowledge and reasoning, so that it is less likely to reduce valuable aspects of 
decision-making in the relation between the human actors and the environment. 
 
From an existential perspective, mediation consists of invitation and inhibition of 
aspects of acting (Verbeek, 2000, chapter 6). This relates to the notion of script in 
actor-network theory. The properties inscribed in the technology can prescribe a 
certain use, if the user subscribes to the script. 
In case-based reasoning, the system uses the complementarity of problem-solving and 
learning to learn from its experiences. At the same time, it takes this responsibility 
away from the user. The system thus inhibits learning from experience in the user. If 
we decide this is undesirable, we have to find a way to invite the user to take part in 
both the problem-solving and learning processes. This can be done by interacting with 
the user during the processes, as in CREEK. This also invites the user to subscribe to 
the script, because human actors are used to interacting. A remaining question is how 
to make this interaction meaningful, so that humans want to subscribe to the script. 
 
What we see is that we can make evaluations of the behaviour of systems in a 
decision-making environment by focusing on the relations between humans and their 
reality and the role these artefacts play in it. Postphenomenology has in this sense a 
narrower focus than the Actor-Network Theory, which considers all kinds of relations 
between actants. The main advantage of the postphenomenological approach is that it 
uses the relational view without being relativistic in evaluative questions. We used the 
actor-network approach to assess what is possible in using intelligent systems in 
environments that require the concept of free will. The postphenomenological 
approach can be used to assess what is desirable. In the next part of the chapter, we 
also consider how to achieve this. 
Machines as minds 
We have described the mediating processes by intelligent systems, focused on case-
based reasoning. This explains the changes these machines cause in the relation 
between humans and the world. But we can also describe intelligent systems as if they 
are related to the world themselves. This makes it possible to address questions about 
the design of intelligent systems in free-will environments. 
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Modelling free will 
We have met two of the characteristics of case-based reasoning: the assumption of 
regularity and the complementarity of problem-solving and learning. The third 
characteristic, the inherent connection between possibilities and alternatives, has not 
yet been described from a postphenomenological perspective. This is because this 
characteristic does not in itself mediate the relation between humans and the 
environment, but is a characteristic of the nature of the system. For humans, this 
connection is self-evident, because in humans, the interpretation of possibilities and 
the decision between alternatives are necessarily connected. 
These two processes are in fact the two dimensions of the relation between humans 
and the world: the hermeneutic and the existential perspective. We do not separate 
between moments of interpretation and moments of acting, because the hermeneutic 
and existential processes are in a continuous state of mutual dependency. Our 
interpretations and decisions are interwoven. And yet it is in the relation between 
them that we become what we are. 
In decision-making, humans interpret the world in terms of possibilities and act 
according to their selection among alternatives. In this connection between the 
possibilities of interpretation and the alternatives of decision, we may observe the 
tension between ‘can’ and ‘will’ as described before. From a hermeneutic perspective, 
we observe how humans interpret the situation in terms of what they can do. From an 
existential perspective, we observe that humans decide what they will do. Free will 
thus becomes a tension between the hermeneutic and existential perspective. 
What is important here, is that we can describe the tension between can and will from 
a phenomenological perspective as a tension between the hermeneutic and existential 
perspectives on the relation between humans and the world. When we view machines 
as related to the world, they also can be viewed as having free will in the tension 
between the two perspectives on this relation. This means that the processes of 
interpretation and acting form the basis for the concept of machine free will. 
 
In case-based reasoning, this is modelled explicitly, because there is an inherent 
connection between possibilities (interpretation in terms of cases from earlier 
experience) and decision (acting based on solutions to prior cases). This opens a track 
for discussing ascribing free will to and inscribing free will in machines. If we 
delegate to machines the connected hermeneutic and existential properties as seen in 
humans, we can model the property of free will. So this is how the conclusion of the 
actor-network chapter of delegating free will to machines can be implemented. 
 
When we need to ascribe free will to machines when we introduce them into decision-
making processes, we need to inscribe this property into the technology. This can be 
achieved by modelling the hermeneutic and existential dimensions of the relation 
between the machine and the world, and connecting them. This creates a tension 
between what the machine ‘can’ do and what it ‘will’ do, which forms the basis of the 
concept of machine free will. 
The hermeneutic and existential planes 
We can describe the modelling by defining two planes for the dimensions. The 
hermeneutic plane thus defines the interpretation of the environment by the machine, 
the existential plane the actions of the machine in the environment. This relates to the 
description of intelligence in chapter 4, where we discussed the epistemological and 
heuristic parts of intelligence (page 11 and further). To model free will, we have to 
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connect the planes to create the relation between ‘can’ and ‘will’. In connecting the 
hermeneutic and the existential plane, we have to model their connection in both 
directions. Furthermore, we have to define the entry points of the connections in the 
planes. 
 
hermeneutic plane 
existential plane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Hermeneutic and existential properties in machines 
 
In CBR, the connections are defined by the processes of problem solving and 
learning. These connect the problem description space with the solution space (see 
Figure 2, page 19). In the problem description space, the interpretation of the problem 
takes place. In the solution space, the system acts by proposing a solution. Therefore, 
the hermeneutic and existential planes in CBR consist of the problem description 
space and the solution space, respectively. The problem solving connects the 
hermeneutic plane to the existential plane by using an interpretation to find a solution; 
learning connects the existential plane to the hermeneutic plane by remembering the 
course of the action and thereby allowing for new future interpretations. The entry 
points are defined in the phases of problem solving and learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
problem solving 
hermeneutic plane (possibilities) 
existential plane (alternatives) 
learning 
2 2 
1 
3 
3
1
Problem solving: 
1. understanding the problem 
2. generating plausible solutions 
3. selecting a good solution 
Learning: 
1. extracting learning sources 
2. constructing new knowledge structures 
3. storing and indexing 
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Figure 6: Hermeneutic and existential properties in CBR 
 
The connections between the hermeneutic and the existential plane thus consist of a 
starting point, a translation and an ending point. These are the three parts of the 
relation that have to be modelled for each direction to make a thorough connection. 
We can generalize the understand-generate-select and extract-construct-store 
divisions of problem solving and learning, respectively, to a general modelling 
framework for the connections between the hermeneutic and the existential plane. 
In the starting point, we have to find the relevant information from the starting plane 
(understanding the problem, extracting learning sources). Then, we have to translate 
the information to the other plane. Finally, we have to make the ending plane accept 
the transferred information (selecting a solution, storing and indexing). The general 
form of connections between the planes becomes thus: 
1. finding relevant information from the starting plane 
2. translating the information to the other plane 
3. accepting the information in the ending plane 
 
This find-translate-accept process can be used to model the connections between the 
hermeneutic and existential plane in any system. Designers should consider that the 
planes are mutually dependent. This means that there should not be an accent on 
either of the planes. In modelling the connections, this implies that the connections 
should be equivalent. Therefore, no a priori distinction should be made in the 
properties of the connections. In CBR, the complementarity of problem solving and 
learning is the characteristic that guarantees the equivalence. 
 
In CREEK, the Application Strategy Model takes care of the transfer from the 
hermeneutic to the existential plane. The Sustained Learning Model takes care of the 
reverse transfer. The complementarity of the processes of problem solving and 
learning makes it somewhat remarkable that the Application Strategy Model is 
domain-dependent, whereas the Sustained Learning Model is considered a meta-level 
model. In the figure, only these two models are shown. The Object level Knowledge 
Model and Combined Reasoning Model form the basis for knowledge and reasoning 
used in the CBR process, respectively. 
 
 
hermeneutic plane 
existential plane 
Application Strategy 
Model 
Sustained Learning 
Model 
Figure 7: Hermeneutic and existential properties in CREEK 
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CREEK thus uses the CBR characteristics without actually taking the consequence of 
equivalence of the connections. By explicitly considering the planes, improvements 
may be possible in the clearness of the design of the system. 
The CBR cycle 
We can now also describe the CBR-cycle in terms of a phenomenological analysis. In 
the RETRIEVE phase, the machine interprets information from the environment in 
terms of stored cases and possibly other knowledge. This is a hermeneutic process. In 
the REUSE phase, this interpretation is used to construct a solution. This means that 
information is transferred to the existential plane. In the existential plane, the solution 
is applied and/or evaluated during the REVISE phase. Then, information is 
transferred back to the hermeneutic plane by learning in the RETAIN phase, where it 
can be used for interpretation of future situations. 
 
 
hermeneutic plane 
existential plane 
REUSE RETAIN 
   RETRIEVE 
     REVISE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The CBR-cycle from a macro-level phenomenological perspective 
 
The three characteristics we defined for case-based reasoning become visible in this 
cycle. The assumption of regularity shows up in the RETRIEVE and REVISE phases, 
which use respectively the regularity between cases and the regularity between 
solutions to process information in the plane. The complementarity of problem 
solving and learning is visible in the symmetry of the REUSE and RETAIN phases. 
Finally, the inherent connection between possibilities and alternatives, or 
interpretation and decision, is present in the connected hermeneutic and existential 
planes. 
 
Thus, in CBR the connection between the hermeneutic and existential plane is cyclic. 
This is different from rule-based systems, where there is only one-way reasoning 
towards a solution. In fact, in these systems the planes are not even explicitly present. 
When trying to find a solution, there is no consideration of possibilities before 
defining alternatives, because the rules provide alternatives directly. In case of an IF-
THEN construction, there are only alternatives, no possibilities. In neural systems, the 
analysis in terms of hermeneutic and existential planes is even more problematic. 
Because the internal representation of information is not known, the system can never 
show the user a difference between what it can do and what it will do. 
On the level of CBR phases, we can in this way draw the phases as either connecting 
the planes or processing data within a plane. On a lower level, in each of the phases 
both hermeneutic and existential processes take place. In interaction with the user, the 
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system both acts and interprets. So when the design moves to a more detailed level, 
we must again assess the relations between the hermeneutic and existential processes. 
In this way, we can model a system such that it exhibits the property of free will on 
both macro- and micro-level. 
 
In CREEK, the reasoning that implements the phases is based on an activate-explain-
focus explanation engine.  
Figure 9: The CBR process and the explanation engine (Aamodt, 1995) 
 
The steps of activating knowledge structures, explaining candidate facts and focusing 
on a conclusion can be viewed as a micro-level cycle themselves. Activate determines 
the possibilities of the micro-situation. Explain translates the possibilities into 
alternatives, but also does part of the decision-making by reducing the number of 
alternatives. Focus defines the final conclusion, but must also be responsible for the 
translation to the hermeneutic plane, because there is no fourth phase.  
 
 
Figure 10: CREEK from a micro-level phenomenological perspective 
 
The three phases of reasoning thus are responsible for four parts of the cycle. In the 
perspective I introduced, it would make more sense to have both the macro-level 
cycle of CBR and the micro-level cycle of CREEK consist of four phases. Still, there 
must be a lower level of operation, because the user may be consulted within the 
explain phase, so that both hermeneutic and existential processes are necessary in the 
interaction. 
 
This analysis does not yet map to a method of design of intelligent system. Verbeek 
(2000) distinguishes in postphenomenology between observation (micro-perception) 
and experience (macro-perception) in the hermeneutic perspective and between acting 
and existence in the existential perspective. The first concepts refer to micro-level 
hermeneutic plane 
existential plane 
activate 
   explain focus 
explain / focus 
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analysis, the latter to macro-level. This distinction can be an interesting starting point 
for defining design methods based on the concept of machine free will. 
Conclusions 
By delegating to machines the connected hermeneutic and existential properties as 
seen in humans, it becomes possible to model free will and thereby inscribe the free 
will property into machines. In case-based reasoning, this is done by explicitly 
modelling the connection between possibilities and alternatives. Besides, we can 
describe the CBR cycle in terms of a phenomenological model by drawing the 
problem description space as the hermeneutic plane and the solution space as the 
existential plane. In CBR, the connection between the planes is cyclic. In CREEK, the 
relation between the macro- and micro-level cycles is not clear. Moreover, problem 
solving and learning are not consequently modelled as complementary processes. 
 
Because of the place of CBR in decision-making, it mediates the relation between 
human decision-makers and the world. We can evaluate the role of intelligent systems 
by describing this mediation in terms of amplification and reduction from a 
hermeneutic perspective, and invitation and inhibition from an existential perspective. 
CREEK is able to solve some possible problems that are raised by this evaluation, 
namely the reduction of valuable aspects of reasoning and the inhibition of learning 
processes in the user. 
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8 Discussion 
Summary 
We have described the issue of free will and intelligent machines from a social 
perspective. The main approach taken was that we cannot have machines taking over 
decision-making in areas that require ascribing the concept of free will without 
ascribing them this property as well. The actor-network approach in philosophy 
showed that we can inscribe properties into artefacts. When we need to ascribe free 
will to an intelligence chain where the consciousness of decision-making is hidden, 
we need to inscribe the free will property into machines that are taking part in the 
chain. This inscription is possible by modelling the connection between hermeneutic 
and existential processes. 
The script delegated to the machine becomes visible in interaction with the user 
during the use of the system. Because the decision-making process is translated when 
we introduce intelligent systems, we have to assess what systems will do with their 
environment when we design them. We can do this by describing the mediation by the 
machine of relations between humans involved and their reality. This allows for 
evaluation of the technology by addressing existential and hermeneutic questions, 
which would not be possible from a pure constructivist perspective. 
 
The case-based reasoning paradigm in artificial intelligence has been analysed from 
the perspective above. It turned out that this paradigm can be described in terms of 
hermeneutic and existential processes, whereas this is difficult for rule-based systems 
and probably even more complicated for neural systems. The CREEK system has 
been discussed as a concrete example of a CBR system. Some evaluative remarks 
could be made about the design of this system, based on the analysis of free will 
issues. 
Some important questions 
Now that we have an overview of the issue of free will and intelligent machines as 
described in this paper, we can ask questions about the nature of the research. I will 
discuss some important questions here. This is a somewhat more theoretical part of 
the paper, and designers interested in implications for their work might want to skip it. 
Interaction points and phenomenology 
What is the relationship between the interaction points defined in the fourth chapter, 
the intelligence chain in the sixth chapter, and the phenomenological analysis in the 
last chapter? 
 
The interaction points (the knowledge level in design and the dialogue level in use) 
form the locations of free will issues in intelligent machines, from the relational view 
on free will. The relational view asserts that free will arises from the relations 
between agents and their environment, which means that it arises in the knowledge 
and dialogue levels in intelligent machines. 
From an actor-network point of view, the actants form relations at these interaction 
points, by which the acting programme becomes translated. Both connected actants 
modify each other’s behaviour, which can be seen as an interaction. In this 
interaction, we can observe free will issues. In the actor-network approach, the main 
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point made was that designers can interact with the system in such a way that they 
inscribe free will into the system, which becomes visible in the interaction with the 
user. 
In the phenomenological approach, we discussed both the mediating properties of 
intelligent machines in human-reality relations, and the relation between the machine 
itself and reality. We focussed on the issues of evaluating intelligent machines, and 
modelling free will, respectively. Because machines are related to reality themselves 
(when we see them as having intentionality), we could also have described the 
mediating character of designers and users in the relation between the machine and its 
reality. This would mean a more symmetrical approach. 
 
This makes clear how the phenomenological approach relates to the interaction points 
and the actor-network view. When observing free will issues at interaction points, the 
free will becomes visible in the tension between the hermeneutic and existential views 
that the actants have on each other. By mediating hermeneutic and existential aspects 
of each other’s relation to reality, they change the acting programme. Thus, 
phenomenology makes two things visible at the interaction points: a tension between 
the hermeneutic and existential views on the actants, and the acting that they perform 
to mediate the relation between the other actant and reality. 
Free will and mediation 
The evaluative perspective in phenomenology, which concerns mediation of human-
reality relations by technology, is not clearly related to the concept of free will. What 
is the relevance of that analysis? 
 
As discussed above, mediation is one of the two things that phenomenology makes 
visible at the interaction points. The other is the tension between hermeneutic and 
existential views on the actants, by which we find a tension between ‘can’ and ‘will’ 
and thus can observe free will issues. But this is only a part of the actants’ role in the 
interaction. When they interact, they do not only ascribe free will to the other actant 
because of the observed tension, but also because they feel the other actant changes 
their own relation to reality. The actants observe each other’s free will both in the 
observed tension between the hermeneutic and existential views on the other, and 
because the mediation of their own relation to reality by the other, in hermeneutic and 
existential perspective. 
When analysing these issues from the outside, we observe that in the interaction, free 
will emerges from two different sources. First, the actants interpret each other in 
terms of free will, because they observe a tension between ‘can’ and ‘will’. Second, in 
their acting they mediate the relation between the other and his reality, and therefore 
force him to think that they have free will. 
 
The main point here is that when we observe free will in interactions, we observe it 
both in hermeneutic and existential perspectives. For in the hermeneutic perspective, 
we observe that actants interpret each other in terms of free will, and in existential 
perspective, we observe that actants mediate each other’s relation to reality by their 
acting, which requires power. Thus, the evaluative perspective in phenomenology, 
considering the mediation of human-world relations by technology (or, possibly, 
mediation of technology-world relations by humans), is nothing more than the 
existential perspective on free will issues, whereas the hermeneutic perspective 
considers the tension between ‘can’ and ‘will’ in interpretation of the actants. The 
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evaluative issue is that we design the mediating technologies ourselves, and thus are 
more or less responsible for their behaviour in the interaction. But the concept of 
responsibility requires a whole new approach, which I will not investigate here. 
Coherence of the free will concept 
The relational free will concept has been introduced as an alternative to 
philosophical questions about the nature of free will. How is it possible to use this 
perspective for a discussion about modelling free will? 
 
The relational view on free will asserts that it is impossible for society to do without 
the concept of free will, because it is a presumption for meaningful interaction. In 
interaction, free will is both a weakness and a strength. It is a weakness, because 
others see in us a tension between what we can do and what we will do, which makes 
us vulnerable. It is a strength, because we are nonetheless able to change their relation 
to reality by our presence. For humans, this is just a part of daily life. For machines, 
we have to design what we think is important. 
In machines, the roots of free will can be described as a tension between what a 
machine ‘can’ do and what it actually ‘will’ do. This can be modelled by using a 
phenomenological approach and design the system such that it has both hermeneutic 
and existential properties, which are related to each other. But this is only the 
weakness of free will that we are modelling. We implicitly also model the machine’s 
strength, by allowing it to change the relations to reality of people that work with it. 
This demands evaluation of our design by clarifying the mediating properties. 
 
Thus, the relational view on free will is ‘applied’ by designing intelligent machines. 
Because machines are designed, it is not self-evident that they can take part in 
interactions like humans are used to. Therefore, we have to look for a way to make 
them suitable for use in areas that require the concept of free will, like decision-
making. The modelling of free will seems to require a view on the nature of free will 
anyway, which is incoherent with a relational view. That is not my intention. The only 
thing I want to show, is that we can make machines behave like they have free will, 
by modelling the tension between ‘can’ and ‘will’ as we observe it in humans. Still, 
the concept of free will is strictly relational, because it is only in interaction that it 
becomes visible. 
Topics for further research 
Based on the discussion above and in earlier chapters, we can define some areas 
where further research is possible. This includes both theoretical questions and 
practical issues concerning design of intelligent machines. 
Free will, power and responsibility 
When we talk about designing free will and evaluating system design, we necessarily 
assume that we are free in the choices involved. That is basically nothing more than 
what I discussed when I asserted that society cannot do without the concept of free 
will. But when we talk about the power actants have to change relations between 
other actants and reality, and when we assert that there is responsibility involved in 
designing intelligent systems, we are introducing two concepts that have not been 
clarified from the relational perspective of free will. In further research, the relevance 
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of the concepts of power and responsibility can be discussed, and they might be useful 
for further clarifying the machine free will issue. 
Design methods 
In this paper, I showed that it is possible to model the free will property in machines. I 
have not discussed any methods that designers can use to achieve this. In defining 
such methods, we have to discuss the machine free will concept on different levels of 
design. As mentioned before, the distinction between macro- and micro-level analysis 
in postphenomenology can be used as a starting point for such a discussion. We then 
also need to address the question how these different levels in design (on the 
knowledge level) relate to aspects of the use of the systems (on the dialogue level). 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The relational view of free will was an attempt to avoid difficult philosophical 
questions while analysing intelligent systems using this concept. By now, we can 
conclude that the perspective on free will as introduced in chapter 3 and 4 is useful for 
analysing such systems. By defining interaction points between the system and the 
environment, free will can be made visible without discussing the transcendental 
presumptions, in the tension between what a machine can do and what it will do. This 
was the first goal of the research. 
The second goal was to show that it is possible to analyse a concrete system using this 
perspective. By being able to evaluate the CREEK system, this has been accounted 
for. Moreover, the intention to use existing philosophical theories to build the analysis 
has also been covered, by taking the actor-network and phenomenological views as 
starting points for the discussion. These theories made visible that we can inscribe 
free will into machines and even model it. This requires for an evaluative analysis of 
the way in which the system mediates the relation between the people that work with 
it and their reality. 
 
For designers, it is important to consider free will issues when building machines that 
are required to function in parts of society where the concept of free will is necessary. 
This especially applies to decision-making. I have shown that it is possible to use 
phenomenological concepts for modelling free will in intelligent machines. This 
analysis can be used as a starting point for defining design methods. 
 
In this paper, we analysed the design of the case-based reasoning system CREEK. It 
turned out that the basic characteristics of case-based reasoning could be interpreted 
in terms of free will issues, whereas there were some difficulties in the design of 
CREEK. First, the complementarity of problem solving and learning is not visible in 
the modules used. Second, on a micro-level the four-phase CBR cycle transforms into 
a three-phase explanation engine, which obscures the relation between the existential 
and hermeneutic processes that form the basis of free will issues. On the other hand, 
CREEK is able to solve some problems that might arise when analysing CBR from a 
mediation perspective. By focusing on different types of knowledge and reasoning 
and interaction with the user, CREEK prevents CBR from reducing valuable aspects 
of decision-making and inhibiting the learning process in the user. 
 43
Final remarks 
The analysis of free will issues as presented in this paper does not yet define design 
methods for inscribing free will. This reflects a general problem in computer science, 
namely the challenge to move from a posteriori analysis to a priori design 
requirements. In this paper, I have tried to transfer the free will issue from a 
philosophical concept to the design context. Further research can be performed to 
define concrete requirements and methods on the basis of this analysis. 
 
The main focus of this paper has been on intelligent systems. However, there is of 
course a view on life in general that lies behind the analysis. It is not possible to 
account for that view here, as it would take many pages and would certainly need 
some systematisation.  Whatever is present between the lines, is not less worthy than 
the actual text, but it is up to the reader to find out what it is and how to use it. Or 
maybe it is possible to use a very intelligent machine to extract this information. 
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